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Résumé : Le premier Congrès pour l’unité de la science (Congrès international
de philosophie scientifique) qui s’est tenu à Paris en 1935 comprenait deux
sessions, consacrées l’une à l’induction, l’autre aux probabilités. Des représen-
tants éminents du mouvement pour une philosophie scientifique ont présenté
des communications dans ces sessions : dans la première sont intervenus Hans
Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick et Rudolf Carnap, dans la seconde, Reichenbach,
Bruno de Finetti, Zygmunt Zawirski, Schlick et Janina Hosiasson, — dans
cet ordre. Les sujets abordés concernaient la nature des lois scientifiques,
le problème du sens et le principe de l’empirisme, ainsi que des questions
connexes portant sur la confirmation des hypothèses scientifiques. Sur la nature
des probabilités, les principales interprétations étaient représentées, à savoir
le logicisme, le fréquentisme et le subjectivisme. Fut également examinée la
possibilité de construire une logique probabiliste. Ce chapitre passe en revue
les différentes contributions présentées dans ces deux sessions, à partir du texte
publié dans les actes du Congrès.
Abstract: The First International Congress for the Unity of Science (Congrès
international de philosophie scientifique) held in Paris in 1935 hosted two
sessions devoted to “Induction” and “Probability” respectively. Outstanding
representatives of the movement for scientific philosophy read papers in
those sessions: the one on Induction hosted papers by Hans Reichenbach,
Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap, while the one on Probability hosted
papers by Reichenbach, Bruno de Finetti, Zygmunt Zawirski, Schlick, and
Janina Hosiasson—in that order. The topics addressed concern the nature
of scientific laws, the problem of meaning, and the principle of empiricism,
together with the related issue of confirmation of scientific hypotheses. The
nature of probability was also addressed, covering all major interpretations,
namely logicism, frequentism, and subjectivism. The possibility of building a
Philosophia Scientiæ, 22(3), 2018, 213–232.
214 Maria Carla Galavotti
probability logic was also explored. In this paper, the contributions delivered
at the sessions on Induction and Probability are surveyed, based on the version
published in the fourth volume of the proceedings.
1 The first Congress for the Unity
of Science
A peculiar feature of the First Congress for the Unity of Science (Congrès
international de philosophie scientifique) held in Paris in 1935 is that it
hosted two sessions devoted to “Induction” and “Probability” respectively.
The other Congresses of Scientific Philosophy—five more were organized
between 1936 and 1941—included only a few papers on the foundations of
probability, read within sessions devoted to general methodology, but no
session was expressly devoted to probability and/or induction. The session
on Induction at the Paris Congress included papers by Hans Reichenbach,
Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap, while the session on Probability included
papers by Reichenbach, Bruno de Finetti, Zygmunt Zawirski, Schlick and
Janina Hosiasson—in that order. The proceedings of such sessions are
published in volume IV of the Actes du Congrès international de philosophie
scientifique (Sorbonne, Paris 1935) appearing in Actualités scientifiques et
industrielles, n. 391, 1936 [Actes 1936].
The topics addressed concern the nature of scientific laws, the problem
of meaning and the principle of empiricism, together with the related issue
of confirmation of scientific hypotheses. The nature of probability was
addressed, covering all major interpretations, namely logicism, frequentism,
and subjectivism. The possibility of building a probability logic was also
explored. In what follows, the contributions delivered at the sessions on
Induction and Probability are surveyed, based on the version published in
the fourth volume of the proceedings.
2 Schlick’s contributions
2.1 Schlick’s paper in the session on Induction
Schlick’s paper belonging to the session on Induction, called “Sind die
Naturgesetze Konventionen?” [“Are Natural Laws Conventions?”] [Schlick
1936a], tackles the vexed question of the status of scientific laws, arguing
against the thesis that laws of nature are conventions. To start with, Schlick
draws a distinction between conventions and genuine assertions, pointing out
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that “the validity of a convention is of our own making” [Schlick 1936a, 438].
He then clarifies that the question whether laws are conventions concerns
natural laws, not the laws we encounter in logic and mathematics:
For in logic and mathematics the symbols have precisely the mean-
ing which is bestowed upon them by what is expressly written
down or formulated in some other fashion. Mathematics and logic
do not point beyond themselves; they do not transcend their own
realm of symbols; here there is no fundamental difference between
theorem and definition. [Schlick 1936a, 441]
The difference between logic and mathematics on the one hand and the
empirical sciences on the other rests on the distinction between sentence [Satz]
and proposition [Aussage], which plays a key role within Schlick’s conception
of a natural law. In Schlick’s words: “we shall mean by ‘sentence’ a sequence
of linguistic signs with the help of which something can be asserted” [Schlick
1936a, 441]; by contrast, “we shall mean by a ‘proposition’ such a sentence
together with its meaning” where the “meaning” of a sentence is “the set
of rules which are stipulated for the actual application of the sentence, that
is, for the practical use of the sentence in the representation of facts. In
short, a ‘proposition’ is a ‘sentence’ insofar as it actually fulfils the function of
communication” [Schlick 1936a, 441–442].
Having drawn this distinction and made clear the difference between the
laws belonging to the formal sciences and those occurring in the empirical
sciences, Schlick examines in some detail two examples, the “energy principle”
and Galileo’s “law of inertia”, arguing that they cannot be regarded as either
definitions or sentences. On the one hand, they are not definitions because only
facts can confirm or refute them; on the other, they are not sentences because
their applicability to facts requires some meaning to be attached to them. The
equations of physics, like the axioms of geometry, are “mere sentences”: “each
by itself is subject to arbitrary changes in formulation” [Schlick 1936a, 443].
By contrast
[...] the proper content of a natural law may be seen in the
fact that to certain grammatical rules (for instance, a geometry)
some quite definite propositions correspond as true descriptions
of reality. And this fact is completely invariant with respect to
any arbitrary changes in notation. [Schlick 1936a, 443]
In conclusion, the meaning of scientific laws is given by the rules that state
how they are to be used to describe facts, but while such rules are conventions,
natural laws are not.
As Schlick emphasized,
[...] all genuine propositions, as for instance natural laws, are
something objective, something invariant with respect to the
manner of representation, and not dependent in any way upon
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convention. What is conventional and, hence, arbitrary, is only
the form of expression, the symbols, the sentences, thus only
something external or superficial which is immaterial to the
empirical scientist. [Schlick 1936a, 444]
This claim goes hand in hand with the conviction, put forward at the end of
the paper, that “in science, as in knowledge generally, we search for nothing
but the truth” [Schlick 1936a, 444]. Since only propositions, not sentences,
can be true or false, natural laws, being propositions, can fulfil the ultimate
goal of science.
To sum up, Schlick’s rebuttal of conventionalism is grounded in the claim
that at the core of scientific knowledge, there exists a set of propositions that
are not chosen at will, but have an objective character deriving from the fact
that they are supported by experience.
2.2 Schlick’s paper in the Probability session
Schlick’s paper read during the session on Probability, called “Gesetz und
Wahrscheinlichkeit” [Law and Probability] [Schlick 1936b], addresses two
questions: (1) “When does science speak of a law?” and (2) “How does it
employ the concept of ‘probability’?”. In reply to the first question, Schlick
maintains that the fundamental character of a law is regularity: “regularity
is merely another name for conformity to a law” [Schlick 1936b, 447]. By
contrast, chance is taken to be “the opposite of ‘law’ ”. Probability applies
to chance, and the “so-called laws of probability are the rules of chance”
[Schlick 1936b, 446]. Chance is characterized as irregularity, so that “the
attempts of the probability theorists to define chance are in fact directed
at describing the particular kind of ‘irregularity’ or lack of rules, which
is the opposite of lawfulness” [Schlick 1936b, 447]. This leads Schlick to
conclude that “we attribute chance to those events which obey the rules of
the probability calculus” [Schlick 1936b, 449]. The probability calculus is
“a purely mathematical (logical) discipline, which can be constructed, just
like arithmetic or ‘pure’ geometry, in complete independence of any facts of
experience” [Schlick 1936b, 449].
Regarding his interpretation of probability, Schlick endorses Bernard
Bolzano’s logical approach, according to which probability is a “degree of
validity” [Grad der Gültigkeit] relative to a proposition describing a certain
hypothesis with respect to other propositions describing the possibilities that
are open to it.1 In assigning a value to a proposition stating a hypothesis, we
can proceed either a priori, by carefully considering the physical attributes of
a given object, such as a roulette wheel or a die, or a posteriori, relying on
past experience of frequencies. Schlick believes that
1. See [Bolzano 1837], to which Schlick refers.
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[...] the two methods do not differ in principle. For in the last
resort all our general statements about reality go back to the
fact that we often or always observed certain sequences. [Schlick
1936b, 453]
After having observed frequencies in the past, we take them as an indication
of the fact that the hypothesis we formulated stands with the possibilities
open to it in the same ratio as that given by observed frequencies. On this
ground, Schlick claims that the logical definition suggested by Bolzano and
the definition in terms of frequencies can be brought together. However, it
is worth noting that when making such claim, Schlick does not have in mind
the frequency approach developed by Richard von Mises and Reichenbach,
but merely the idea that information about frequencies guides the assessment
of probabilities in the way described above. In his article “Causality in con-
temporary physics”, Schlick explicitly rejects von Mises’s and Reichenbach’s
frequency interpretation, on account of the fact that according to such an
interpretation, “it would everywhere be necessary to proceed to the limit for
infinitely many cases—which for empiricism is naturally a senseless statement”
[Schlick 1931, 201]. In the same article, Schlick adds that “The only usable
method for defining probabilities is, in fact, that which utilizes logical ranges
(Bolzano, von Kries, Wittgenstein, Waismann)” [Schlick 1931, 201].
Schlick is no less critical of the subjective view of probability, and his Paris
paper maintains that:
probability statements have a perfectly objective meaning, and
are not, say, an expression of subjective states of expectations.
They say something about the relation of two or more propositions
to one another in respect of their truth; they have no concern
with whether or not we believe in the truth of those propositions.
[Schlick 1936b, 454]
Schlick rejects the idea that the probability calculus can be conceived as a
generalized logic, extensively discussed during the Paris Congress. Probability,
he claims, is not
[...] a mean between truth and falsity. Every statement is either
true or false [...] and probability is something that attaches to
the statement beyond this, namely in relation to other statements.
Truth and falsity are not the upper and lower limits of probability,
for if they were so, it would have to be a contradiction to
attribute truth and probability simultaneously to one and the
same proposition. [Schlick 1936b, 454–455].
The conclusion reached at the end of the paper is that the two questions
posed in the beginning boil down to one and the same, because the first can
be reduced to the second. To substantiate this claim, Schlick compares the
notion of probability with the basic concepts of geometry, holding that there
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is a strong analogy between them, for “in both cases it is a matter of setting
up such definitions as enable us to arrive at maximally convenient descriptions
and prognoses of facts” [Schlick 1936b, 455]. It should not pass unnoticed that
the last claim provides a connection between the two papers delivered in the
Paris Congress sessions on Induction and Probability.
3 Carnap’s contribution to the session on
Induction
Carnap’s contribution to the session on Induction bears the title “Wahrheit
und Bewährung” [Carnap 1936b]. An expanded English version of this
paper appeared in 1949 under the title “Truth and Confirmation” [Carnap
1949], which includes some new passages, and a few passages taken from
the 1946 article “Remarks on induction and truth” [Carnap 1946]. It is
interesting to compare the text published in the proceedings of the Paris
Congress with the article published in 1949. The Paris version of the
paper sets the notion of confirmation in opposition to that of truth, on the
account that truth is time-independent, while confirmation is time-dependent.
By contrast, a passage Carnap added to his 1949 paper claims that only
the pragmatic concept of confirmation is time-dependent, while the semantic
concept is “independent of the temporal aspect” because “in using this
concept we are merely asserting an analytic or logical truth which is a sheer
consequence of the definition of ‘degree of confirmation’ (weight, strength of
evidence) presupposed” [Carnap 1936b, 119].
A major difference between the paper read in Paris and its 1949 version
is that the latter mentions the concept of degree of confirmation, which is
absent from the earlier version. Albeit Carnap started working intensively on
probability around the mid-forties, the notion of degree of confirmation made
its first appearance in his writings at the end of “Testability and meaning”
[Carnap 1936a, 1937]. This is evidence that Carnap started thinking of the
quantitative notion of confirmation—together with the option of adopting
probability as a tool for dealing with significance and confirmation—already in
the mid-thirties, although perhaps when attending the Paris Congress those
ideas were still in a fledgling state. Surely Carnap’s interest in probability
originated from the problem of cognitive significance, and more particularly
from the need to overcome the strictures connected with the verifiability theory
of meaning that imprinted the first stage of logical empiricism.
Carnap’s shift from a strict to a liberalized version of the principle of
empiricism is documented by the comparison between the Paris paper and the
article published in 1949. While admitting that knowledge of the invariable
truth of synthetic propositions is inaccessible, Carnap was not ready to give
up the notion of truth. In this connection, one of the passages added in
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the 1949 paper claims disagreement with Felix Kaufmann, Otto Neurath and
Reichenbach, who
[...] are of the opinion that the semantical concept of truth, at
least in its application to synthetic sentences concerning physical
things, ought to be abandoned because it can never be decided
with absolute certainty for any given sentence whether it is true
or not. I agree [so the passage continues] that it can never be
decided. But is the inference valid which leads from this result to
the conclusion that the concept of truth is inadmissible? [Carnap
1936b, 122–123]
In order to allow for a negative answer to this question, a liberalized version
of the principle of empiricism had to be adopted. In “Truth and confirmation”
such a weaker principle of empiricism P* is stated as follows:
A term (predicate) is a legitimate scientific term (has cognitive
content, is empirically meaningful) if and only if a sentence
applying the term to a given instance can possibly be confirmed
to at least some degree. [Carnap 1936b, 123]
Carnap points out that “possibly” should be taken to mean “if certain
specifiable observations occur”, and “to some degree” should not be “meant
as necessarily implying a numerical evaluation”. He also clarifies that
P* is a simplified formulation of the “requirement of confirmabil-
ity” [reference in footnote to “Testability and meaning” ] which,
I think, is essentially in agreement with Reichenbach’s “first
principle of the probabilistic theory of meaning” [reference in
footnote to “Experience and Prediction”], both being liberalized
versions of the older requirement of verifiability as stated by
C. S. Peirce, Wittgenstein, and others. [Carnap 1936b, 123]
The agreement with Reichenbach pronounced in the above-mentioned
passage sounds puzzling because Carnap and Reichenbach had quite different
ways of dealing with the theory of meaning. If there is agreement, it does
not go beyond the conviction they both shared that the strict principle of
empiricism should be abandoned in favour of a liberalized principle. On the
one hand, Carnap was one of the chief proponents of the principle of strict
empiricism, but did not hesitate to revise it as soon as he became aware of its
difficulties. A comparison between the paper published in the proceedings and
its revised 1949 version gives evidence of this shift, which presumably started
soon after the Paris Congress.
On the other hand, Reichenbach—who had been working on probability
in connection with the interpretation of contemporary science since the mid-
twenties—was always critical of verifiability and soon urged the need to go
beyond it. He emphasized the close ties between the significance of scientific
statements and their predictive character, which is a condition for their
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testability. At the same time, he reaffirmed that “the theory of knowledge
is a theory of prediction” [Reichenbach 1937, 89], and put forward his theory
of probability as a “theory of propositions about the future” [Reichenbach
1936b, 159]. Such a theory includes in the first place a probabilistic
theory of meaning:
The theory of propositions about the future will [...] be a theory
in which the two truth-values, true and false, are replaced by a
continuous scale of probability. [Reichenbach 1936b, 154]
Reichenbach’s probabilistic theory of meaning
[...] substituted probability relations for equivalence relations and
conceived of verification as a procedure in terms of probabilities
rather than in terms of truth [...] it abandoned the program of
defining “the meaning” of a sentence. Instead, it merely laid down
two principles of meaning; the first stating the conditions under
which a sentence has meaning; the second the conditions under
which two sentences have the same meaning.
[Reichenbach 1951, 47]
It is noteworthy that Reichenbach intended his own probabilistic approach
as a confutation of the reductionist attitude he attributed to logical empiricists
including Carnap, whom he already charged with reductionism and lack of
consideration for the probabilistic aspects of science in his review of the Aufbau
published in 1933, where he writes:
It is a puzzle to me just how logical neo-positivism proposes to
include assertions of probability in its system, and I am under the
impression that this is not possible without an essential violation
of its basic principles. [Reichenbach 1933, 407]
Later on, Reichenbach criticized Carnap’s reduction chains as defined in
“Testability and meaning” claiming that they represent “too primitive in-
struments for the construction of scientific language” [Reichenbach 1951, 48]
because they rely on logical implication, not on probability.
4 Reichenbach’s Paris papers
At the Paris Congress, Reichenbach delivered one paper in the Induction
session, namely “Die Induktion als Methode der wissenschaftlichen
Erkenntnis” [Reichenbach 1936a], and one in the Probability session, called
“Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik als Form wissenschaftlichen Denkens” [Reichenbach
1936c]. The two papers are strictly related: not surprisingly, given that
Reichenbach regarded the inductive method as inextricably intertwined with
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probability and the main purpose of his contributions is to argue in favour of
a strict connection between probability and induction.
The link between induction and probability is provided by the rule of
induction [Induktionsregel], which right at the beginning of Reichenbach’s first
paper is stated as follows: take a series of n events, which are partly P and
partly non−P , and takem to be the number of P , and hn = m/n the frequency
of P among the n events which have been observed; the rule of induction
propounds to assume that when the series is prolonged, the frequency hn will
converge towards a limit close to hn. It corresponds to what in The Theory
of Probability Reichenbach calls induction by enumeration, namely a method
which is “based on counting the relative frequency [of a certain attribute] in an
initial section of the sequence, and consists in the inference that the relative
frequency observed will persist approximately for the rest of the sequence; or,
in other words, that the observed value represents, within certain limits of
exactness, the value of the limit for the whole sequence” [Reichenbach 1949,
351]. This formulation highlights the link between induction and probability:
probabilities are determined by induction by enumeration, and conversely
induction is performed in a probabilistic fashion. Whenever we assess the
probability of an uncertain event we make a wager, pretty much like the
gambler who “has to make a prediction before every game, although he knows
that the calculated probability has a meaning only for larger numbers; and he
makes his decision by betting, or as we shall say, by positing the more probable
event” [Reichenbach 1949, 314]. Reichenbach calls a probability attribution
a posit, namely “a statement with which we deal as true, although the truth
value is unknown” [Reichenbach 1949, 373].
The theory of probability—or inductive inference, since for Reichenbach
the two amount to the same thing—is a theory of posits. Partly in the paper
belonging to the session on Induction and partly in the one belonging to the
session on Probability, Reichenbach outlines the main features of his theory
of posits. Posits differ depending on whether they are made in a context of
primitive or advanced knowledge; posits made in a state of advanced knowledge
are called appraised, whereas posits made in a state of primitive knowledge are
called anticipative, or blind. Within primitive knowledge, no prior information
on probabilities is available and use is made of the rule of induction, whereas
advanced knowledge includes information on priors, to which the calculus of
probabilities can be applied. All posits are characterized by a weight, but
while appraised posits, which are made in the context of advanced knowledge,
have a definite weight, blind posits, which are made in the context of primitive
knowledge, have unknown weight, and are approximate in character. However,
if the sequence has a limit, anticipative posits can be corrected. According to
Reichenbach, this is simply a consequence of the convergence assured by the
rule of induction. That of being self-correcting is the crucial feature of this
procedure—called the method of concatenated inductions—that starts with
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blind posits and goes on to formulate appraised posits that become part of a
complex system.2
The self-corrective character of the procedure provides the grounds for
its justification, and more generally for the justification of induction. The
argument put forward by Reichenbach focusses on the rule of induction, which
is the building block of his method of concatenated inductions. Starting
from the tenet that induction cannot be justified on logical grounds, as
convincingly argued by David Hume, Reichenbach seeks a justification on
pragmatical grounds, and argues that inductive inference, and more in
particular the rule of induction, can be justified on the basis of its predictive
success, which makes it the best possible guide to the future. This is so
precisely because of its self-corrective character. The argument is stated in
The Theory of Probability as follows:
the rule of induction is justified as an instrument of positing
because it is a method of which we know that if it is possible
to make statements about the future we shall find them by means
of this method. [Reichenbach 1949, 475]
In other words, the rule of induction is a necessary condition for making
good predictions. As claimed in the first of Reichenbach’s Paris papers: “the
application of the rule does not guarantee success, but without using it, success
is not to be obtained at all” [Reichenbach 1936a, 4, my translation].
Reichenbach’s second paper is devoted to probability logic, based on the
idea that the probability calculus can be translated into a multivalued logic
in which the values “true” and “false” are the limiting cases of probability.3
He points out that the attempt to combine probability with the logic of truth
faces a peculiar problem, arising from the fact that when a statement about
a future event contains a probability value, such a statement can be verified
only after the event has occurred. This calls for some way of bringing together
probability, which can take many values, with the two values of truth and
falsehood. Reichenbach thinks that the problem is solved by the frequency
theory, which combines statements about single events and statements about
frequencies in the proper way, because “the frequency interpretation derives
the degree of probability from an enumeration of the truth values of individual
statements” [Reichenbach 1932, 311]. Under the frequency interpretation,
probability refers to sequences (namely to series of statements), while truth
refers to single sentences, but since the propositional sequence “can be
conceived as an extension of the concept of statement” [Reichenbach 1932,
312], probability logic can be seen as a logic of propositional sequences and
“appears as a generalization of the logic of statements” [Reichenbach 1932,
2. For more on Reichenbach’s inductivism see [Galavotti 2011], see also [Glymour
& Eberhardt 2016].
3. Chapter 10 of Reichenbach’s The Theory of Probability spells out the topic in
some detail [Reichenbach 1949, chap. 10].
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313]. Reichenbach’s position in this connection was sharply criticized by
Janina Hosiasson in the paper she delivered in Paris.
Instead of going into the details of their exchange on the topic, it is
worth mentioning that towards the end of his second paper, Reichenbach
puts forward a view of science as a continuous search for the truth [Richtung
zur Wahrheit], which advances by augmenting the degree of probability of
knowledge [see Reichenbach 1936c]. This process is realized by formulating
increasingly accurate appraised posits, according to the method of concate-
nated inductions. Moreover, science taken as a whole can be seen as a blind
posit. This picture is rooted in Reichenbach’s conviction that there are true
probability values characterizing chance phenomena, which are in general
unknown but can be approached by means of the inductive method. Such
a conviction represents a cornerstone of the frequency theory, which embodies
an objective notion of probability as opposed to the subjective interpretation
upheld by authors like Frank Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti, also shared by
another participant in the Paris Congress, namely Janina Hosiasson.4
5 About Hosiasson
The paper delivered by Hosiasson during the Paris Congress, bearing the title
“La théorie des probabilités est-elle une logique généralisée? Analyse critique”
[Hosiasson 1936], is entirely devoted to a criticism of Reichenbach’s probability
logic, her main thesis being that the theory of probability cannot be considered
a generalization of the logic of statements, whatever meaning is assigned to
the notion of “generalization”. Hosiasson’s paper also moves some objections
against Zygmunt Zawirski, who in an article published in 1934 (in Polish) had
also made an attempt to treat probability as many-valued logic. Zawirski took
part in the Paris Congress delivering a paper titled “Les rapports de la logique
polyvalente avec le calcul des probabilités” [Zawirski 1936], which contains a
revision of his earlier position, partly provoked by some objections moved by
Hosiasson in former debate. Attempts to build probability logic conceived as
a generalization of two-valued logic were in tune with the spirit of the time,
imbued with a deep trust in the power of logic and axiomatization, and received
great impulse from the work of Jan Łukasiewicz, Hugh MacColl and others.
However, the programme of dealing with probability within the framework of
many-valued logic did not last long, and the attempts in that direction made
by authors like Reichenbach and Zawirski did not impact much on subsequent
literature. For this reason, and given the technical character of the topic, it
will not be examined in depth herein.
Instead, it does not seem out of place to mention that Janina Hosiasson
was an original thinker, unduly overlooked by subsequent literature. A
representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School active before the Second World
4. On the different interpretations of probability see [Galavotti 2005].
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War,5 Hosiasson focussed on the foundations of probability, induction and
confirmation. Under the influence of the Polish logician Stefan Mazurkiewicz,
who in 1932 published an axiomatization of probability which she espoused
with minor changes, and of John Maynard Keynes’ Treatise on Probability
(1921), Hosiasson adopted an epistemic approach to probability, embracing a
perspective close to subjectivism. She regarded probability as justified belief,
grounded on the fundamental assumption of mathematical expectation, and
assigned probability the task of providing a guide to decision and action.
According to Hosiasson, justified belief is the best form of knowledge that
can be obtained, whereas absolute truth and completeness of knowledge
are unattainable. Probability is therefore necessary to the advancement of
knowledge, which proceeds inductively. Moving from this conviction Hosiasson
set herself the goal of analysing the nature of probabilistic induction, and her
work in that connection anticipated subsequent research in a number of ways.6
Hosiasson’s “Why do we Prefer Probabilities Relative to Many Data?”
[Hosiasson 1931] addresses the question: “How do we account for probabilities
in particular cases?”, answering that “in a considerable number of cases in
ordinary life we take account of them by considering the amount of something
which could be said to be a mathematical expectation” [Hosiasson 1931, 30].
This brings her close to Frank Plumpton Ramsey’s perspective, with the
difference that Hosiasson takes an axiomatic approach, assuming mathematical
expectation as an axiom rather than a principle of psychology, as Ramsey
did. By appealing to mathematical expectation, she deliberately shares
Ramsey’s pragmatist stand, as suggested by her claim that “taking gains
or mathematical expectations into consideration could be considered as an
epistemological answer only from a pragmatist point of view” [Hosiasson 1931,
36]. Noteworthy, in the same paper, is footnote 15 in which Hosiasson writes:
I am greatly indebted for clearness on this question to an un-
published paper by Mr F.P. Ramsey on “Truth and probability”
which the kindness of Mr Braithwaite has enabled me to read. I
had, however, previously thought independently on similar lines.
[Hosiasson 1931, 30]
This is a remarkable claim, bringing evidence that Hosiasson was among the
first to embrace a subjective view of probability.
Hosiasson’s conception of knowledge also bears strong resemblance to that
upheld by Ramsey. According to her definition, knowledge is “an aggregate of
opinions justified, actual and connected—in an adequate degree” [Hosiasson
1948, 253]. The similarity with Ramsey’s view of knowledge as “obtained by
a reliable process” is striking [see Ramsey 1990, 110–111, note “Knowledge”
(1927)]. Moreover, like Ramsey, Hosiasson regarded knowledge as belief of a
special sort, not just entertained by individuals, but apt to be shared by the
5. See [Woleński 2017] for more on the Lvov-Warsaw school.
6. For more on Hosiasson, see [Galavotti 2008].
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community of men. The advancement of knowledge requires induction and
probability, and depends on the increase in weight of a certain hypothesis in
the light of new evidence.
Hosiasson’s best-known article, namely “On Confirmation” [Hosiasson
1940], contains a proposal for a solution in probabilistic terms to the
“raven paradox”—also known as “Hempel’s paradox”, because it undermines
the notion of confirmation developed by Carl Gustav Hempel [see Hempel
1937].7 Unlike Hempel, who focussed on a qualitative notion of confirmation,
Hosiasson opted for a quantitative approach based on the possibility of
discriminating between instances of the paradoxical and non-paradoxical
kind, the idea being that a non-paradoxical instance of a certain hypothesis
increases its prior probability to a greater degree than a paradoxical instance.
In “Studies in the logic of confirmation” [Hempel 1945], Hempel deems
Hosiasson’s discussion of the issue “illuminating”. Furthermore, in 1966,
Patrick Suppes proposed a solution to the raven paradox along Bayesian lines,
claiming to have borrowed the leading idea from Hosiasson [see Suppes 1966].
6 Bruno de Finetti’s contribution to
the session on Probability
Bruno de Finetti’s paper, bearing the title “La logique de la probabilité”
[de Finetti 1936], contributes to the debate on probabilistic logic by outlining
what the author calls the logic of trievents, namely a three-valued logic
obtained as a “superposition” to two-valued logic by adding to the two truth
values “true” and “false” the third value “null”. In this way, de Finetti obtains
a system of propositional logic which is monotonic, unlike other many-valued
logics, such as that of Łukasiewicz which is non-monotonic. De Finetti’s logic is
about conditional events, and subsequent literature has shown it more relevant
to the logic of conditionals than to probability theory. It was precisely in
this spirit that an English version of the paper was published in 1995. As
convincingly argued by Alberto Mura, de Finetti’s logic anticipated the work of
other authors, including Stephen Cole Kleene’s “strong material implication”
and Stephen Blamey’s partial logic.8
According to de Finetti, a trievent corresponds to A|B (A given B), defined
as “the logical entity which is considered: 1o ) true if A and B are true; 2o )
false if A is false and B is true; 3o ) null if B is false” [de Finetti 1936, 184]. A
trievent is a function of B and (A∩B) alone; in case B does not happen A|B is
undecidable, or void, in the sense that it cannot take any value. Then, the value
“N” (null) is not a truth value on a par with “true” and “false”, but expresses
7. For more details, see [Galavotti 2008].
8. See [Mura 2009] for further details.
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the impossibility of assigning a truth value. In an essay called L’invenzione
della verità,9 de Finetti illustrates the idea by means of the following example:
If, for instance, I say: “supposing that I miss the train, I shall
leave by car”, I am formulating a “trievent”, which will be either
true or false if, after missing the train, I leave by car or not, and
it will be null if I do not miss the train. [de Finetti 2006, 103],
quoted from [Mura 2009, 204]
The notion of trievent reflects the distinction, de Finetti considered vitally
important, between referring to an event as a statement and referring to an
event as a condition, see [de Finetti 1995] and [Mura 2009, 204]. At the same
time, such a notion highlights the fundamental role played by conditional
probability within de Finetti’s perspective. It should not pass unnoticed
that there is a perfect match between the definition of a trievent and that
of conditional probability, namely: pA|B = p(A ∩B)/pB; provided pB > 0.
The logic of trievents is in full agreement with the subjective interpretation
of probability, of which de Finetti is unanimously considered one of the
founders, together with Frank Ramsey. The second part of de Finetti’s Paris
paper outlines the subjective outlook, according to which probability is a
quantitative expression of the degree of belief in the occurrence of an event,
entertained by a person in a state of uncertainty. Probability is taken as a
primitive notion endowed with a psychological foundation, which needs an
operative definition in order to be measured and used in practice. Albeit,
this can be done in a number of ways, the paper de Finetti delivered in
Paris adopts the notion of betting, maintaining that probability expresses “the
conditions under which one judges it equitable to bet [on the occurrence of an
event]; an individual is coherent if there exists no combination of stakes which
permits a sure win in betting with him on the basis of probabilities which he
has evaluated” [de Finetti 1936, 186].10 Coherence is the cornerstone of the
subjective theory of probability, due to the fact that the laws of probability
can be derived from the assumption of coherence—a result stated by Ramsey
and proved by de Finetti. For subjectivists, all coherent probability functions
are admissible and disagreement is permitted because probability evaluations
are not taken to be univocally determined by empirical evidence—such as
frequencies—but to be affected also by contextual (subjective) elements—such
as experience and the personal abilities of evaluators.
A crucial component of the subjective approach is the claim that with
increasing evidence, the opinions of different people will converge. This
is guaranteed by the result known as de Finetti’s representation theorem,
which shows that the adoption of Bayes’ method, taken in conjunction with
9. Originally written in 1934, but published (posthumously) only in 2006 [see
de Finetti 2006].
10. In later writings, de Finetti adopted alternative methods for measuring
probability as degree of belief, such as scoring rules—see Galavotti [Galavotti 2001]
for more on this.
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exchangeability, leads to convergence between subjective degrees of belief and
observed frequencies.11 Events belonging to a sequence are exchangeable if the
probability of h successes in n events is the same, for whatever permutation
of the n events, and for every n and h ≤ n. It should be pointed out
that in his Paris paper, de Finetti does not use the term “ exchangeability”,
which was suggested to him in 1939 by Maurice Fréchet, instead he speaks
of “equivalent” events [événements équivalents]. Exchangeability, used in
connection with Bayes’s rule plays a crucial role within de Finetti’s perspec-
tive, where it provides the foundation of the whole of statistical inference.
The justification of this method is given by its success, as the best method
allowing for good forecasting.
Part of de Finetti’s subjectivism is the conviction that probability is
always definite and known, and consequently there are no unknown true
probabilities. That objective probability should be discarded as a metaphysical
concept is a claim that appears in many of de Finetti’s writings, including
the preface to the English edition of Theory of Probability [de Finetti 1970]
where he wanted printed in capital letters “Probability does not exist”.
The same idea is expressed in the paper delivered in Paris, where he
states that “all metaphysical ‘explanation’ [...] explains nothing but hides
substantial problems and profound reasons behind words stripped of sense”
[de Finetti 1936, 187].
Having said that, it must be added that de Finetti took seriously the
problem of the objectivity of probability evaluations, or in other words
the problem of defining “good probability appraisers”, to use an expression
borrowed from the Bayesian statistician Irving John Good. In order to
understand de Finetti’s position, one should bear in mind his recommendation
that the definition of probability should not be conflated with its evaluation.
While probability is defined as subjective degree of belief, its evaluation
depends on both objective elements, including frequencies and symmetries,
and subjective components such as intuition, analogy, and expertise. In
particular, de Finetti repeatedly stressed in his writings that frequency, and
more generally empirical information of all sorts, is a fundamental ingredient
of the evaluation of probability, as clearly stated in the following passage:
Whatever can be taken as objective regarding the events under
consideration is not at all rejected by the subjective approach; in
particular, frequency and all that can be asserted about frequency
finds room there. [de Finetti 1949, 87, my translation]
De Finetti’s Paris paper ends with a sharp criticism of the frequency
theory. His main objection regards the notion of limit, considered inapplicable
to scientific practice, firstly because indefinitely long sequences are not
observable, and secondly because a limiting value of probability is compatible
11. This result, already found by de Finetti in 1928, is spelled out in some detail
in [de Finetti 1937].
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with a very large number of negative observed results. For instance, a very
long sequence of throws of a coin where the frequency of tails tends to ½ as the
number of trials increases, is compatible with the fact that the first 10,000 trials
give tails, but in such a case no experimenter would assign probability 12
to heads/tails. For de Finetti probability is about single events rather than
indefinitely long sequences of repeatable events, and their evaluation is more
complex than envisaged by frequentists, as it depends on myriad ingredients,
partly empirical and partly subjective.
7 Concluding remarks
On the whole, the papers delivered during the two sessions on Induction
and Probability at the Paris Congress testify to the richness of the debate
held during the meeting. A major focus of attention at that stage of
the development of scientific philosophy was the confirmation of scientific
hypotheses, together with the related issue of the principle of empiricism. In
that connection, Schlick and Carnap’s papers were in line with the mainstream
attitude embraced by logical empiricists. However, soon after the Paris
Congress Carnap’s thought underwent major changes, and one can speculate
that the Paris debate fostered such a shift.
Given the logical empiricists’ deep trust in the clarifying power of logic,
which made them regard it as the ideal tool for the realization of the unity of
science and the construction of scientific philosophy, it is not surprising that
at the time of the Paris Congress, so much effort was devoted to the project of
building a logic of probability. As observed earlier, subsequent developments
have shown such a project was short-lived, so that in retrospect the critical
remarks raised by Hosiasson in her Paris paper look decidedly far-sighted.
The interpretation of probability was widely debated in Paris. Schlick
took sides with the logical theory against frequentism and subjectivism,
while Reichenbach argued in favour of the frequency view and described
in some detail his own approach, which strays in several ways from that
upheld by von Mises.12 In particular, Reichenbach’s paper outlines the
“method of concatenated inductions”, spelled out in more detail in Experience
and Prediction [Reichenbach 1938]. By the time of the Paris Congress,
Reichenbach had published the first edition of The Theory of Probability,
namely Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre [Reichenbach 1935] which does not contain
the distinction between primitive and advanced knowledge, nor the prag-
matic argument for the justification of induction. The fact that his Paris
paper addresses such topics shows that for Reichenbach, the year 1935
marks a time of transition.
Neither Carnap nor Hosiasson address the issue of the nature of probability
in their Paris papers. At the time, Hosiasson had already embraced the
12. See [Galavotti 2011] for more on this.
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subjective approach in her previous work, while Carnap was on the verge of
turning to probability in order to deal with confirmation, but his first papers
on probability date back to the mid-forties.
In 1935, de Finetti had already developed his subjective theory of
probability together with his “representation theorem”, which are described
in his contribution to the Paris Congress. In addition, the latter contains an
exposition of his logic of trievents, which revealed its potential many years
later, in connection with the logic of conditionals. This adds to the interest
of his paper, and more in general of the sessions on Induction and Probability
held in Paris during the Congress of Scientific Philosophy.
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